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WHAT FOLLOWS FROM DEFENSIVE NON-LIABILITY?  
 
GERALD LANG 
 
 
Theories of self-GHIHQFHWHQGWRLQYHVWKHDYLO\LQ¶OLDELOLW\MXVWLILFDWLRQV·LIWKH$WWDFNHULV
liable to have defensive violence deployed against him by the Defender, then he will not 
be wronged by such violence, and self-defence becomes, as a result, morally 
unproblematic. This paper contends that liability justifications are overrated. The deeper 
contribution to an explanation of why defensive permissions exist is made by the 
'HIHQGHU·Vnon-liability. Drawing on both canonical cases of self-defence, featuring 
Culpable Attackers, and more penumbral cases of self-defence, involving Non-
Responsible Threats, a case is DVVHPEOHGIRUWKH¶1RQ-/LDELOLW\)LUVW$FFRXQW·RIVHOI-
defence. 
 
I 
Introduction.  In canonical cases of individual self-defence, in which an Attacker culpably attacks 
an innocent Defender, something normatively eventful happens to both of them: the Attacker 
seems to lose normative powers, whereas the Defender appears to gain normative powers. When 
the conditions for permissible self-defence are in place, the Attacker is no longer protected by a 
right against harm which he used to have, and the Defender acquires a right, to inflict harm, 
which she did not used to have. The normative baton is somehow passed from one of these 
agents to the other. We can refer to this DVWKH¶&HQWUDO1RUPDWLYH7UDQVLWLRQ of Self-Defence·, 
RUWKH¶&HQWUDO1RUPDWLYH7UDQVLWLRQ·IRUVKRUW (Lang 2014, p. 38). What explains the Central 
Normative Transition? What are the moving parts of that explanation, and how are they related 
to each other? These are the questions which concern me here. 
The argument unfolds as follows. §II sets up the basic picture in more detail. In §III, I 
outline the Falling Man case, in which the Defender is threatened by a falling person who is not 
exercising his agency at all. With the aid of a further familiar case, Rolling Stone, §§IV to VII 
explore various puzzles and slowly build up a case for what I call the Non-Liability First Account. 
§VIII returns to the canonical case of self-defence to see how, even here, the Non-Liability First 
Account has an important role to play. 
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II 
Why Liability?  A commonly invoked piece of critical apparatus in accounts of self-defence is 
liabilityVSHFLILFDOO\WKH$WWDFNHU·Vdefensive liability.1 The fact that the Attacker is liable to 
defensive violence is supposed to explain how defensive violence is morally permissible. This is 
because, in becoming liable to be attacked, the Attacker loses the protection of his ordinary right 
not to be attacked (McMahan 2009, p. 10).2 If the Attacker is no longer protected by this right, 
then the Defender does not infringe or violate it in defending herself against the Attacker, and so 
the mere fact of defensive violence becomes morally unproblematic.3 
Two further important achievements ensue from liability justifications; alternatively, two 
problems are avoided (cf. Quong 2012, pp. 45-6). 
FirstWKH'HIHQGHU·Vpossession of a liability justification ensures that the Attacker, upon 
being attacked, does not, at least typically, acquire the permission to counter-defend himself 
against the Defender. We do not end up, implausibly, with a symmetrical set of permissions, 
possessed by WKH'HIHQGHUDQG$WWDFNHUDOLNHWKH$WWDFNHU·Voffence, however culpable, does 
not become morally revalorized due simply to the fact that the Defender, however innocent, is 
defending herself against him. Thus liability justifications are in a position to avoid the Symmetry 
Problem.  
Second, the right of self-defence does not expand to become, in effect, a right of self-
preservation: the Defender cannot kill Innocent Bystanders in order to save herself, since it is 
commonly supposed that Innocent Bystanders, unlike the Attacker, are not liable to be attacked. 
7KH'HIHQGHU·VOLDELOLW\MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUUHVSRQGLQJZLWKOHWKDOGHIHQVLYHIRUFHZLOOEHSURSHUO\
directed at the Attacker, but not at those other people whose deaths would neutralize the threat 
posed by the Attacker, and thereby serve as a vehicle of WKH'HIHQGHU·Vself-preservation. 
(Imagine, in the Shield case, that the Defender was in a position to grab an Innocent Bystander as 
DVKLHOGWKXVIRUFLQJKLPWRDEVRUEWKH$WWDFNHU·VDJJUHVVLRQ The Defender lacks a liability 
justification for using the Innocent Shield in this way.) In this way, liability justifications avoid 
the over-generation of defensive permissions. We can call this the Over-Generation Problem. 
Liability justifications sidestep the Over-Generation Problem, whereas any theory of self-defence 
that purported to be able to do without liability justifications would appear to be highly 
vulnerable to it. 
                                                          
1 There are, of course, other species of liability in the criminal law and tort law. My concern here 
is solely with defensive liability³moreover, with moral, not legal, defensive liability. 
2 For McMahan, the languages of loss, liability, and forfeiture are stationed together. 
3 Subject to the familiar conditions of necessity, proportionality, and imminence. 
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 So far, liability is a normative place-holder. It announces itself primarily by its effects: it 
has the effect of restricting counter-defensive measures by the Attacker, and focusing defensive 
violence only on the Attacker rather than on Innocent Bystanders as well. But how exactly does 
it do this? 
There are really two issues embedded in this question. The first concerns the criterion of 
liability, or a statement of the conditions in which liability is triggered. The second concerns the 
explanation of why liability is triggered in these particular circumstances.4 
There are different criteria of defensive liability. I shall mention just two of them. Judith 
Thomson, for example, makes the Attacker defensively liable just when and because the Attacker 
ZLOORWKHUZLVHYLRODWHWKH'HIHQGHU·VULJKWV (Thomson 1991). Jeff McMahan, by contrast, insists 
that the Attacker is liable only when he poses an objectively unjust threat to the Defender for 
which he is also responsible (McMahan 2005). There are different explanatory pictures in play as 
well. Thomson thinks that defensive liability ensues from rights violation; in threatening to 
YLRODWHWKH'HIHQGHU·VULJKWVWKH$WWDFNHUIRUfeits his own rights. For McMahan, defensive 
liability is the solution to a distributive problem: when harm is unavoidable, it is fitting to 
distribute it in ZD\VZKLFKDUHMXVW6LQFHWKH$WWDFNHU·VDFWLRQVPDNHKDUPXQDYRLGDEOHWKHQWKH
just solution will make the Attacker liable to bear that harm (McMahan 2005, 2009).5  
Theories of individual defensive liability, whatever they amount to, tend to embark from 
the brightly lit cases in which there is a pronounced normative asymmetry between Attacker and 
Defender, and then rely on the powers of that illumination as they proceed to adjudicate on the 
murkier cases. Imagine, for example, that the Defender is wholly innocent³she is not 
endangering anyone, and is entitled to be where she is³while the Attacker is malicious, and 
comfortably satisfies whatever conditions for moral responsibility we would normally insist upon 
for the assignment of blame. Call this case Culpable Attacker. Culpable Attacker outlines the 
conditions in which a theory of defensive liability can expect to enjoy the most confident 
application. The normative asymmetry between Attacker and Defender helps to deliver the claim 
that the Attacker is liable to be attacked by the Defender, or by third-parties acting on the 
'HIHQGHU·VEHKDOI That is so, regardless of what the substantive content of the theory of self-
defence amounts to: whether it is concerned with the fair distribution of unavoidable harm, or 
rights violation, or something else yet again. 
                                                          
4 Lazar (2009, p. 703), distinguishes in similar fashion EHWZHHQWKH¶H[SODQDWRU\VWUXFWXUH·RIDQ
account of self-defence, and ¶FULWHULDRIOLDELOLW\·IRU specific ways in which the right to life are 
lost. 
5 0F0DKDQ·VSRVLWLRQLVIRUFHIXOO\WHVWHGE\/D]DUDQG0DSHO 
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These theories must then find something to say about the less brightly lit cases in which 
that normative asymmetry between Attacker and Defender is reduced or even erased. In this sort 
of case, the Defender is still innocent, but the Attacker is also wholly innocent, due to his lack of 
moral responsibility for the threat he poses to the Defender. I want to give pride of place to one 
of these less brightly lit cases, in which the Attacker is not obviously liable. I then extend this 
discussion, in a reversal of the usual direction of travel, to the more brightly lit cases, in which 
the normative asymmetry between Attacker and Defender is ostensibly more pronounced. 
Though the full reasons for adopting this strategy will emerge in due course, my leading idea, 
very roughly, is that theorists of self-defence have focused too much on the $WWDFNHU·VOLDELOLW\
when their primary investment should have been in WKH'HIHQGHU·VQRQ-liability. It is the non-
liability of the Defender, not the liability of the Attacker, which permits us a straightforward 
interpretation of the cases in which the normative asymmetry between Defender and Attacker is 
starkest, and also offers us a convincing way of interpreting cases in which that asymmetry is 
moot.6  
My aim, then, is to sketch the Non-Liability First Account of private self-defence. 
According to the Non-Liability First Account, non-liability is the most important normative 
primitive in these cases; the facts about liability are constructed, in part, out of the facts about 
non-liability. The Non-Liability First Account pronounces on the harder cases, and makes it 
clearer on what is doing the justificatory work in the easier cases.  
 
III 
The Falling Man Case and the Scope of Defensive Permissions.  Here is a version of a famous case 
illustrating the erasure, or at least partial erasure, of normative asymmetry between Attacker and 
Defender, originally due to Robert Nozick: 
 
Falling Man: Victoria is standing at the bottom of a well, with no escape options, and will be 
crushed to death by an entirely innocent, unconscious falling man, Victor, unless she 
vaporizes him with her ray gun. Victor, by contrast, will be saved if he falls on Victoria, who 
will cushion his fall (Nozick 1974, p. 37). 
 
                                                          
6 See Doggett (2017) for an argument whose ambitions are similar to mine. I am highly 
sympathetic to its basic thrust, but there are at least some differences in emphasis between us.  
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Falling Man is the most extreme instance of a Non-Responsible Threat: Victor poses danger to 
Victoria, who is not liable to be harmed, but in ways which entirely bypass his agency. Victor is 
falling, not acting; he is unconscious, not conscious. No agency is involved.7  
 For Thomson, the scope of the Defender·s defensive permissions encompasses cases 
such as Falling Man. It does not matter that Victor·VDJHQF\LVentirely suppressed. His movements 
still threaten Victoria; and, since he is a moral agent and she is a moral agent, these movements 
acquire an immediate moral significance. More precisely, by threatening Victoria, who is 
innocent, 9LFWRU·V movements risk a violation of her rights. Thomson thinks, in effect, that there 
are no relevant differences among the different species of Attackers, just as long as the Defender 
is innocent. On Thomson·VYLHZ, Villainous Aggressors, Innocent Aggressors³whose threats to 
Defenders are explained by compromised agency such as ignorance and psychosis³as well as 
Non-Responsible Threats such as Victor in Falling Man, are all liable to be killed in defence, since 
they will otherwise vLRODWHWKH'HIHQGHU·VULJKWV. She writes, in connection to the particular cases 
she uses to illustrate these different categories of Attacker: 
 
[T]he villainous driver in Villainous Aggressor has no right to kill you, and surely it is also 
true of the fault-free driver in Innocent Aggressor that he has no right to kill you. In 
Hohfeldian terms, neither of the two drivers has a privilege of killing you. For them to 
lack the privilege of killing you, however, is for you to have rights (Hohfeldian claims) 
that they not do so, rights they will infringe if they succeed in killing you (Thomson 1991, 
pp. 300-1). 
 
7KRPVRQ·VDUJXPHQWDWLYHSDWKDSSHDUVWREH plotted firmly from within the familiar Hohfeldian 
nexus, according to which, if agent T lacks the claim-right to kill agent D, then D must have the 
right not to be killed by T³a right which T will violate if he is not resisted, however faultless he 
would be for this violation. So in this way all species of Attackers, including Non-Responsible 
Threats, will be imported into the moral world of rights-violations, regardless of their current 
agential capacity.8 
 7KRPVRQUHPDUNVWKDWULJKWVYLRODWLRQ¶LVQHFHVVDU\IRULWMXVWLVQRWVXIILFLHQWWRMXVWLI\
\RXUNLOOLQJDSHUVRQWKDWWKDWSHUVRQZLOORWKHUZLVHNLOO\RX· (Thomson 1991, p. 303). If these 
Threats and Attackers are not imported into the moral world as would-be rights-violators, the 
                                                          
7 See McMahan (2009, pp. 167-73)7KHWHUP¶1RQ-Responsible 7KUHDW·LVVORZO\acquiring 
hegemony over WKHWHUP¶,QQRFHQW7KUHDW·ZKLFKZDVUHODWLYHO\FRPPRQSODFHLQWKHROGHU
literature, including Thomson (1991) and McMahan (1994). 
8 7KRPVRQ·VVWDQFHRQWKHVFRSHRIGHIHQVLYHSHUPLVVLRQVGRHVQRWIROORZMXVWIURPWKHIDFW
that she advances a rights-based account. Rodin (2002), (2014) also espouses a rights-based 
account, but insists upon a narrower range of permissions which exclude Non-Responsible 
Threats and some forms of Innocent Aggressor. 
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Defender will either be left without adequate protection, given these agents· likely immunity to 
defensive force, or the Over-Generation Problem will immediately arise. To see why, compare 
Falling Man with Bridge, which conforms to the structure of what Thomson calls a ¶Riding-
Roughshod-over-a-%\VWDQGHU·case (Thomson 1991, p. 290):9 
 
Bridge: Jules is fleeing from Jim·s culpable and impermissible attack on him. His only 
hope of escaping from it is to cross a rickety rope bridge. This bridge will bear the weight 
of only one person. Already standing on the bridge is Catherine. If Jules shakes the 
bridge, Catherine will fall to her death, leaving the bridge unoccupied, and Jules can make 
good on his escape. If Jules refrains from removing Catherine from the bridge and 
securing this escape option, he will be killed by Jim. 
 
2Q7KRPVRQ·VYLHZCatherine retains the right to life, and Jules will act impermissibly if he 
removes her from the bridge. The difference between Catherine in Bridge and Victor in Falling 
Man is that Victor is threatening to violate Victoria·VULJKWV, whereas Catherine (unlike Jim) does 
not threaten to violate -XOHV· rights. So the reference to rights-YLRODWLRQLVUHTXLUHGE\7KRPVRQ·V 
own lights, to distinguish Attackers and Threats, on the one hand, from Innocent Bystanders, on 
the other hand.  
Many writers have argued, in response to Thomson, that Victor cannot be reasonably 
represented as being liable to being killed in self-defence. This conclusion arises from deeper 
reflection on the fact that the threat posed by Victor is not the product of his agency. He has no 
agential capacity: his falling cannot qualify as acting, and a fortiori cannot qualify as rights-violation. 
To boost support for this conclusion, a Non-Responsible Threat such as Victor is often 
compared to a non-sentient entity, entirely lacking in agency. This is the Stone Objection (Otsuka 
1994, p. 80; Rodin 2002, pp. 85-7; McMahan 1994, p. 276, Quong 2009, p. 515, and elsewhere). 
Consider: 
 
Rolling Stone: A stone is rolling slowly towards Sly, who can avoid being crushed by it only 
by destroying it with his bazooka. 
 
                                                          
9 Although Thomson herself is committed to the claim that Catherine is inviolable, it must be 
acknowledged that Bridge presents us with a controversial form of bystanderDV&DWKHULQH·V 
EORFNDJHRI-XOHV·escape options may tempt us to characterize her as an indirect Threat. For a 
helpful discussion, see Frowe (2014, pp. 31 ff.). Feel free to substitute another sort of bystander, 
such as one the one in Shield, if you think Bridge is not fit for purpose.  
7 
 
No one is denying, of course, that Sly may destroy the stone. The problem is that the claim that 
9LFWRULVFDSDEOHRIYLRODWLQJ9LFWRULD·VULJKWVLQFalling Man is no more plausible than the claim 
that the stone threatens to violate Sly·VULJKWVLQRolling Stone. However deadly the stone may be, 
it does not exhibit any signs of agency. The stone may present a deadly threat to a morally 
significant entity³Sly³but its movements resist any moral characterization. Whatever happens 
to Sly, the stone will not have violated his rights. The problem now is that a Non-Responsible 
Threat, such as Victor, appears to be in exactly the same position as the stone. Even Thomson 
admits that the falling Non-Responsible Threat does not do anything; he is merely falling in the 
direction of the Defender (Thomson 1991, p. 287). It follows that we have no more secure a 
EDVLVIRUVD\LQJWKDW9LFWRUZLOOYLRODWH9LFWRULD·VULJKWV than we have for saying that the stone 
will violate Sly·VULJKWVThe Stone Objection thus makes an important contribution to the claim 
that Victor is an unintelligible subject of duties. Since he is not an intelligible subject of duties, 
the threat he poses to Victoria, as McMahan puts it, ¶LVQHLWKHUSHUPLVVLEOHQRULPSHUPLVVLEOH· 
(McMahan 2009, p. 169). 
If Victor is relevantly like the stone, then he will not violate Victoria·s rights, and there is 
no basis on which to establish his liability. Compare Catherine in Bridge: she is simply in the way. 
She does not fall within the scope of -XOHV· liability justification because being in the wrong place 
at the wrong time³from -XOHV· perspective³does not suffice to establish her liability. So, if 
Victor does not threaten to violate Victoria·s right, then Victoria·s violent response to him 
cannot be depicted as the exercise of her right of self-defence, but simply one of self-
preservation. This exposes Thomson to the Over-Generation Problem. If Victoria can 
permissibly kill Victor, then it should also be permissible for Jules to kill Catherine. 
How should Thomson respond to the Stone Objection? She might say that, given the 
fact that Victor, unlike the stone, is a moral agent, it then follows that his movements, even if 
there is nothing he can do to control them, command a special moral significance simply because 
of his status as a moral agent. Just as a rising tide lifts all boats, the fact that Victor possesses this 
general moral standing may have the effect of transforming the significance of events and 
movements that would, in other circumstances, remain morally inert. Though this line of 
argument does not strike me as obviously unsatisfactory, it risks a stalemate with its opponents, 
so I will not be relying upon it. 
The Stone Objection is often deployed in the argument as little more than satirical 
embellishment for those who wish to persuade us that Victor is not defensively liable. I want to 
deny that deeper reflection on Rolling Stone can get us to reach that particular verdict about Falling 
Man. But I also think that reflection on Rolling Stone can help us to recover deeper lessons about 
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Falling Man, and indeed about the Central Normative Transition itself. It can help us to see that 
the primary normative focus on should be on VictoriD·VQRQ-OLDELOLW\UDWKHUWKDQ9LFWRU·V
liability. We must proceed slowly, however. 
 
IV 
Stones and Privileges.  There may be an immediate problem with the Stone Objection. By 
uncovering it, we can make more fundamental progress, not just with our grasp of the Falling 
Man case, but with the respective roles that liability and non-liability play in the Central 
Normative Transition. To set the ball rolling, we need to revisit what Thomson says in the 
passages we encountered above, as well as Rolling Stone.  
ThRPVRQ·VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWEHFDXVHWKH7KUHDWODFNVWKHprivilege or liberty right to kill 
WKH'HIHQGHUKHWKUHDWHQVWRYLRODWHWKH'HIHQGHU·VULJKW3HUKDSVZHFDQJHWE\LQWKHILUVW
instance, with only the first of these claims. For it seems to be a robust truth that the Threat, 
whatever level of responsibility or agency it manifests, lacks the right to kill the Defender, if the 
Defender is innocent. If it should turn out that the Threat kills the Defender, it will at least be 
true that the Threat had no right to do so. The death of the Defender will not emerge as the 
result of any permission to kill her. 
This claim does not have any embarrassing immediate implications. It applies to Rolling 
Stone as well as to Falling Man. I focus for the moment on the former, since this is where the 
critical venom for the case against VictRULD·VGHIHQVLYHSHUPLVVLRQV is supposed to be gathered. 
The plain fact of the matter is that the stone does lack the privilege, or liberty right, to kill Sly. It 
does not have the liberty right to do anything, and so, as one particular instance of that truth, it 
does not have the right to kill Sly. The normative strain here is carried by the stone, but in a way 
that avoids our having to imbue it with embarrassingly outlandish moral properties. 
We can put the point in another way. Here is one claim: 
 
(1) The stone lacks the right to kill Sly.  
 
The truth of (1) does nothing to augment the prospects of the following claim:  
 
(2) If the stone kills Sly, then Sly·VULJKWVDUHYLRODWHG 
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There is no support for (2) from (1). This is for reasons which are hiding in plain sight in the 
Stone Objection itself. There is no prospect of ratifying (2) due to the truth of the following 
claim: 
 
(3) Stones cannot violate or infringe rights. 
 
Stones are simply not in the rights-violation business. So (3) is plainly true. Sly·V rights will not be 
violated by the stone. But there is surely no immediate tension between (1) and (3). If (3) is true, 
then (1) is merely a highly obvious truth. It could not be the case that the stone has the right to kill 
Sly,10 and so it is not the case that the stone has the right to kill Sly; accordingly, a stone lacks the 
right to kill Sly.11 True, DFODLPRIWKHIRUP¶T ODFNVWKHULJKWWRNLOO6O\·would in most contexts 
license the inference ¶,IT kills Sly, WKHQ6O\·VULJKWVKDYHEHHQ YLRODWHG·%XW any such implication 
can be comfortably cancelled without conceptual confusionZKHQWKHSDUWLFXODULGHQWLW\RI¶T·LV
disclosed.  
 The stone lacks the right to kill Sly. Sly is also permitted to destroy the stone. These are 
easy claims, and obvious truths. But trouble may lie ahead. Consider (1) again: 
 
(1) The stone lacks the right to kill Sly. 
 
Since (1) is true, it is not the case that Sly is liable to being killed by it. So does (4) follow 
plausibly from (1)? 
 
(4) Sly is not liable to be killed by the stone. 
 
If (4) is true, then (5) may be true: 
 
(5) Sly is wronged by being killed by the stone. 
 
But (5) must be false. The stone cannot wrong Sly for exactly the same reason that it cannot 
violate his rights: stones do not interact with moral agents in ways which admit of this kind of 
moral characterization. 
                                                          
10 ,JQRUH¶PDJLFZDQG·FDVHVRIWUDQVIRUPDWLRQVXFKDVZHILQGLQVRPHRIWKHDERUWLRQ
literature. 
11 ,IWKH¶RXJKW·LPSOLHV¶FDQ·SULQFLSOHVWULNHVPost people as true under at least some description 
of it, an even greater level of security should attach to the ¶FDQQRW·LPSOLHV¶GRHVQRW·SULQFLSOe. 
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 This, then, is the danger: we appear to risk the ascription of extravagant moral properties 
to the stone, after all, if we allow (1) to license, in turn, (4), and then (5). We will have ended up 
with the same embarrassment that was facing us when we first entertained the idea that a Non-
Responsible Threat can violate a Defender·V rights. 
 
V 
Non-Responsible Threats and Normative Gaps.  We need to take a step back. In brightly lit self-
defence cases such as Culpable Attacker, the Attacker acts impermissibly, and threatens the 
'HIHQGHU·VULJKWV,WLVWKHLPSHUPLVVLELOLW\RIWKH$WWDFNHU·Vactions which inversely mirrors the 
SHUPLVVLELOLW\RIWKH'HIHQGHU·VGHIHQVLYHYLROHQFHAs McMahan sees matters, Falling Man 
EUHDNVWKHMXVWLILFDWRU\FLUFXLWVRIWKLVEDVLFSLFWXUH,I9LFWRU·VPRYHPHQWVDUHQRW
impermissible, the justificatory chain is broken, and we cannot appeal to them to support the 
FODLPWKDW9LFWRULD·Vdefence is permissible. The permissibility RI9LFWRULD·VGHIHQFHcannot be 
traced to the impermissibility RI9LFWRU·VDWWDFN12 The normative baton cannot be passed between 
them in the normal way. For McMahan, that fact ends the argument: it denies Victoria defensive 
permissions against Victor. SLQFH9LFWRULD·VGHIHQFHLVQRW the response to an impermissible 
attack on her, she cannot acquire a permission to attack Victor. 9LFWRULD·Vdefence is not 
permissible bHFDXVH9LFWRU·VDWWDFNLVnot impermissible. She is simply out of luck, and is under 
moral instruction to resign herself to her fate.13 
There are further implications of this picture, however, which McMahan does not trace 
out, and which leave us in a more theoretically unsettled SRVLWLRQ9LFWRU·VDWWDFNPD\QRWEH
impermissible, but it is not permissible either, if we go on what McMahan himself tells us: as a 
Non-Responsible Threat, Victor is not an intelligible subject of duties, and so his attack is 
neither permissible nor impermissible. As a result, it will then follow that the impermissibility of 
9LFWRULD·s defence cannot be traced back to the permissibility RI9LFWRU·VDWWDFN%XWWKLVSDUWLFXODU
breakage in the usual justificatory circuits does not encourage McMahan to abandon his steadfast 
FRPPLWPHQWWRWKHLPSHUPLVVLELOLW\RI9LFWRULD·VGHIHnce. TKHLPSHUPLVVLELOLW\RI9LFWRULD·V
defence does not, it would seem, need to be partnered with the peUPLVVLELOLW\RI9LFWRU·VDWWDFN. 
 ,Q0F0DKDQ·VDUJXPHQW9LFWRULD·VGHIHQFHLVQRWSHUPLVVLEOHGXHWRWKHIDFWWKDW
VictoU·VDWWDFNLVQRWLPSHUPLVVLEOH7KHIDFWWKDW9LFWRU·VDWWDFNLVQRWSHUPLVVLEOH makes no 
difference. We simply do not encounter these broken justificatory connections in the canonical 
                                                          
12 ,I\RXIHHOWKDWWKHWHUP¶DWWDFN·LVWRRVXJJHVWLYHRIDJHQWLDOOLIHWREHVWULFWO\DSSURSULDWHIHHO
free to substitute a more neutral term.  
13 Though³most writers are careful to add³Victoria might perhaps be excused for killing Victor. 
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self-defence cases such as Culpable Attacker. In these cases, when the Attacker does not act 
permissibly, he also acts impermissibly: the property of not acting permissibly is coextensive with 
the property of acting impermissibly. Clearly, the usual Hohfeldian connections between 
Defender and Attacker cannot be relied upon in Falling Man. There is a normative gap here, which 
invites a new normative settlement about the permissions and non-permissions on offer to the 
various parties. The existence or significance of this gap is not fully appreciated by either 
McMahan or Thomson. 
To make progress, we can revisit Rolling Stone. The stone·VPRYHPHQWV rather more 
obviously than the Non-Responsible Threat, fail to be permissible, and they fail to be 
impermissible. There is no passing of the normative baton from the stone to Sly. The 
permissibility of Sly·VGHIHQFHFDQnot EHWUDFHGWRWKHLPSHUPLVVLELOLW\RIWKHVWRQH·VPRYHPHQWV
But it should be noticed that this claim mirrors the structure of Falling Man, on 0F0DKDQ·V
interpretation of it: WKHSHUPLVVLELOLW\RI9LFWRULD·VGHIHQFHFDQnot be traced to the 
impermissibility RI9LFWRU·VPRYHPHQWV1RZLQFalling Man, McMahan thinks that this 
particular breakage in the normative circuit demonstrates WKDW9LFWRULD·VGHIHQFHLV
impermissible. But that would not be the correct line to follow in Rolling Stone. Sly is clearly 
permitted to destroy the stone. 
Let us consider the other connection in the justificatory circuit, concerning the non-
SHUPLVVLELOLW\RIWKH7KUHDW·VPRYHPHQWVDQGWKHSHUPLVVLELOLW\RIWKH'HIHQGHU·VGHIHQFH What 
seems to certify Sly·VGHIHQFH as a permissible case of defence is that the stone lacks any moral 
standing, and that its movements are therefore not permissible.  
It may be protested that we cannot expect any lessons to be straightforwardly transferred 
from Rolling Stone to Falling Man. First, Victor is a morally significant being³a person, albeit a 
temporarily incapacitated one³unlike the stone.14 Second, and relatedly, the fact that the stone 
has no moral standing at all will place Rolling Stone outside the category of ordinary defensive 
cases. Perhaps we might describe Rolling Stone as a case of threat management, rather than a 
defensive case, properly considered.15 Now these points of disanalogy between Rolling Stone and 
Falling Man may exist. But there is still something to learn from Rolling Stone, regardless of how 
                                                          
14 Otsuka (1994, p. 92), leans heavily on the difference in moral status between Defenders and 
Attackers for some cases of Non-Responsible Threats: for example, when the Non-Responsible 
Threat is a grizzly bear, or an incorrigibly violent psychopath whose agency is permanently 
compromised. I am not fully convinced that this is an advisable strategy for securing these 
particular verdicts. My main concern, however, is to establish that there is another way to go. 
15 Thanks to Corine Besson for discussion of this point. 
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we classify this case; nothing necessarily stops cases of threat management from shedding light 
on cases of defence. 
Rolling Stone teaches us that the impermissibility of a threat is not a necessary condition 
for the permissibility of defensive action. Even if, in the domain of threat management, that is an 
obvious lesson, it is one which can be put to more interesting uses in the domain of defence. For 
we can still ask how the fact that Victor is a morally significant entity manages to defeat the 
suggestion that Victoria lacks permission to defend herself against him, given the fact that the 
threat he poses to her is not permissible. There are different answers to explore in response to 
this question, but they collapse quickly³perhaps unexpectedly quickly. 
It will not do to reply that, because his agency is LQFDSDFLWDWHG9LFWRU·V movements are 
not impermissible. We already know, from Rolling Stone, that the non-impermissibility of the 
movements made by a threatening entity, T, does not confer immunity on T. So perhaps it all 
now depends on what kind of threat T is: Victor, unlike the stone, has moral standing. But 
Victoria also has moral standing. That yields a tie between Victor and Victoria. We need 
something to break that tie: whatever happens, after all, one of them is going to be killed. 
A further suggestion, from McMahan, is that, other things equal, it is better that we 
should settle for a letting die rather than a killing (McMahan 2009, p. 169). If Victoria lets herself 
be killed, rather than choosing to kill Victor, then we will have a letting die rather than a killing. 
But this suggestion is unpromising: 9LFWRULD·V inaction can only produce an outcome where it is 
she who is killed by Victor. She may allow herself to be killed, but it is still a killing which she 
allows. We have a choice of killings, not a choice between a killing and an event which carries 
less moral disvalue than a killing. Of course, McMahan might point out here WKDW9LFWRU·Vkilling 
of Victoria will lack its usual moral toxicity, precisely because he is a Non-Responsible Threat, 
ZKHUHDV9LFWRULD·VNLOOLQJRI9LFWRUZLOOEHRQe for which she is morally responsible. But this 
asymmetry can be pressed into service only if it turns RXWWKDW9LFWRULD·VGHIHQVLYHNLOOLQJRI
9LFWRULVLPSHUPLVVLEOH7KDWLVSUHFLVHO\ZKDW0F0DKDQ·VDUJXPHQWLVWU\LQJWRHVWDEOLVK+H
would be jumping the gun if he were to rely on this point in order to establish his favoured 
conclusion. 
The worry may persist that, since it is always permissible for Sly to destroy the stone, no 
special role in the explanation of that fact is SOD\HGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKHVWRQH·VWKUHDWWRKLPLV
not permissible.16 But I am not proposing to collect any such immediate lessons for our verdict 
on Falling Man from our verdict on Rolling Stone9LFWRU·VDWWDFNRQ9LFWRULDPD\QRWEH
impermissible, but it is not permissible either. And Rolling Stone does teach us that the mere fact 
                                                          
16 Thanks, in particular, to Guy Longworth and Léa Salje for discussion of this point. 
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WKDW9LFWRU·VDWWDFN is not impermissible does not immediately settle the case against the 
SHUPLVVLELOLW\RI9LFWRULD·VGHIHQFH We need more; the story, accordingly, is about to continue. 
 
VI 
Broad Non-Liability.  To recapitulate some relevant points so far: in cases of defence, the 
movements of the threatening entity, T, against the Defender can fall into one of three 
categories. First, T·VPRYHPHQWV might be permissible. Second, T·VPRYHPHQWVPLJKWEH 
impermissible. Third, T·VPRYHPHQWVPLJKWEH neither permissible nor impermissible. If T·V
movements are permissible, then the permissibility of defence is blocked. If T·VPRYHPHQWV are 
impermissible, then the permissibility of defence is enabled. If T·VPRYHPHQWV are not 
permissible and not impermissible, then there are no clear lines of normative transmission from 
T·VVLWXDWLRQ to the Defender·VVLWXDWLRQ. But we need concrete settlements in these cases, on 
pain of gaps in our theory of defence. 
Now it is self-evident that Sly can destroy the stone in Rolling Stone. That fact suggests 
that, at least for some values of T, where T·VPRYHPHQWVDUHQRWSHUPLVVLEOHDQGQRW
impermissible, we should be guided by the non-permissibility of T·VPRYHPHQWVLQDUULYLQJDWWKH
verdict that defence against T is permitted. The only challenge for Sly is to ensure that the 
VWRQH·VPRYHPHQWVIDLOWREHSHUPLVVLEOHAn easy enough task: nothing the stone ever did could 
EHSHUPLVVLEOH7KHVWRQH·VPRYHPHnts do not need, in addition, to be impermissible. Sly can 
destroy it without a second thought. 
More generally, though, what could explain the significance of the non-permissibility of 
T·VPRYHPHQWVLIDQGZKHQWhey are not also impermissible? I suggest that the answer should be 
centrally concerned with facts about the Defender. The Defender has interests which her rights 
serve to protect. The central function of her rights is to protect those interests, and to give her 
normative remedies for preventing their frustration. As a rights-bearer, the Defender can 
typically be expected to have permissible means to frustrate those frustrations, unless she has 
already acted in such a way as to endanger the interests of other rights-bearers.17 These thoughts 
suggest the following schema for ZKDW,FDOO¶EURDGQRQ-OLDELOLW\·, where ¶D·GHVLJQDWHVWKH
'HIHQGHUDQG¶T·GHVLJQDWHVWKH7KUHDW  
 
BROAD NON-LIABILITY: 
                                                          
17 See Lang (2014, pp. 55-7), for one way of articulating this line of argument, drawing liberally 
on Narveson (1965). 
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If D is broadly non-liable to be attacked by T, then it is either the case that (i) D is not 
wronged by T, but is permitted to defend herself by taking the necessary steps to 
neutralize the threat posed by T, or it is the case that (ii) D is wronged by T, and is 
permitted to defend herself by taking the necessary steps to neutralize the threat posed 
by T. 
 
BROAD NON-LIABILITY encompasses a heterogeneous catalogue of Threats. It 
clearly encompasses, as possible values for T, stones, which will fall under (i), and Culpable 
Attackers, who will fall under (ii). These provisions are not suspicious, at least as far as the 
'HIHQGHU·V relationships with Culpable Attackers and stones are concerned. The Defender is, 
after all, permitted to destroy stones. That settles the case for the applicability of (i). And the 
Defender is also permitted to kill Culpable Attackers, assuming necessity and proportionality 
conditions are in place. That settles the case for the applicability of (ii). BROAD NON-
LIABILITY is constructed, in the first instance, out of these data points.  
So far, BROAD NON-LIABILITY is just a schema. It does not contain an argument for 
why every threatening individual should be assigned to either (i) or (ii). So what about Non-
Responsible Threats such as Victor? Morally speaking, Non-Responsible Threats such as Victor 
have a hybrid character: according to proponents of the Stone Objection, they retain the high 
moral standing of ordinary non-liable human persons, which renders it impermissible for 
Defenders to kill them. But the reasons for their moral immunity derive from the fact that their 
movements can be significantly compared to the stone in Rolling Stone. Their agential incapacity 
makes it implausible to suggest that Non-Responsible Threats can wrong WKH'HIHQGHU$QGLVQ·W
that the sticking point? ,IWKH\GRQ·WZURQJWKH'HIHQGHUKRZFDQit be permissible to kill them? 
My suggestion is that, when all is said and done, we do not have to worry about this 
issue. We need not agonize over whether Victor wrongs Victoria. All we need to establish is that 
9LFWRU·VDWWDFNLVnot permissible. So either we can take seriously the analogy between Non-
Responsible Threats and stones, and assign Victoria·s permission to kill Victor under sub-
category (i), or we can resist that analogy, and insist that Victoria·s permission to kill Victor falls 
under sub-category (ii). Either way, Victoria is permitted to kill him. That should count as an 
advantage, given the likelihood of low credences for our intuitions in these unusual cases. 
Proponents of the Stone Objection will, of course, resist these options, and claim that, 
because the Non-Responsible Threat does not violate the 'HIHQGHU·VULJKWV, the Defender ought 
to refrain from violent defence. But I find this attempt to carve out new space for Non-
Responsible Threats unconvincing. It fails to explain, when everything else has been taken into 
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consideration, why the hybrid category of not-permissible-but-not-impermissible should take one form 
when applied to Non-Responsible Threats and another form when applied to stones. The fact 
that Victor is morally valuable and the stone is valueless, which is an obvious enough contrast, 
does not make the critical difference, as we have seen. So what else do we have to go on? We 
should allow VicWRULD·VQRQ-liability to call the shots. 
 
VII 
From Broad Non-Liability to Broad Liability.  Even if we are sceptical about the claim that Victor 
violates 9LFWRULD·V rights, several claims are true: first, Victor poses a causal threat to Victoria; 
second, Victor lacks a right to threaten Victoria; and, third, Victoria is broadly non-liable to be 
threatened by Victor. The combination of these facts delivers the verdict that Victoria may kill 
Victor in defence. Now Victor is clearly liable in some sense. If it is permissible for Victoria to use 
defensive force against him, then Victor is an appropriate object of defensive force. But if Victor is 
an appropriate object of defensive force, then it may seem difficult, in turn, to deny that he is 
liable to defensive force. But if he is liable to defensive force, WKHQDUHQ·WZHFRPPLWWHGWRWKH
familiar entailment that he has³in an agency-free way³wronged her after all? 
My suggestion is that we can indeed affirm that Victor is liable, but in a way that simply 
UHIOHFWVDFRUUHODWLYHIDFWDERXW9LFWRULD·VEURDGQRQ-liability. To see what his liability amounts to, 
I am going to suggest, as an accompaniment to the BROAD NON-LIABILITY schema, the 
following BROAD LIABILITY schema, in which D and T change places: 
   
BROAD LIABILITY: 
If T is broadly liable to be attacked by D, then it is either the case that (iii) T poses a 
threat to D where D is broadly non-liable in sense (i) of BROAD NON-LIABILITY, or 
it is the case that (iv) T poses a threat to D where D is broadly non-liable in sense (ii) of 
BROAD NON-LIABILITY. 
 
How are these two schemas connected? BROAD NON-LIABILITY is the primitive, and 
BROAD LIABILITY is the correlate of it: that is the essence of the Non-Liability First Account. 
If we apply BROAD LIABILITY, then Victor will be broadly liable under either (iii) or 
LY9LFWRU·VLQVWDQWLDWLRQRIEURDGOLDELOLW\LVVLPSO\Whe correlate of the relevant sense of broad 
non-liability instantiated by Victoria. The facts about broad liability ensue from, or are 
constructed out of, the facts about broad non-liability. Once again, BROAD LIABILITY 
encourages us not to worry too much about which of these sub-categories Victor falls under. 
16 
 
Victoria need not be depicted as being wronged by Victor. Again, perhaps his movements are not 
impermissible. But Victoria is nonetheless entitled to kill Victor, because she is broadly non-liable 
not to be killed by him. 
Here is an immediate problem with this line of argument: by the same token, the stone, 
which falls squarely under sub-category (iii), also emerges as being broadly liable. Is this 
ridiculous? No, it is not: thHVWRQH·VVDWLVIDFWLRQRI broad liability is simply the correlate of the 
relevant sense of broad non-liability satisfied by Sly. Sly is of course not wronged by the stone³
that thought is ridiculous³but he is certainly permitted to destroy it. Because he is permitted to 
destroy it, the stone is broadly liable to be destroyed by him. 
 A further challenge awaits BROAD LIABILITY. If Victor has not determinately 
wronged Victoria³if he is simply broadly liable to be killed³then we should recognize that 
there is no real moral stigma that can be attached to him which demonstrates that he, and not an 
Innocent Bystander, is appropriately selected to bear the costs of 9LFWRULD·Vdefence. This point 
gives rise to a dilemma. 
The first horn of it returns us directly to the Over-Generation Problem. If what really 
matters, at the end of the dayLV9LFWRULD·Vbroad non-liability, and if Victor is not determinately 
guilty of wrongdoing, then this point might reduce the significance of the distinction between 
self-defence and self-preservation, and call into question the claim that it is Victor, rather than an 
Innocent Bystander, who is chosen as the appropriate recipient of defensive force. Does it 
matter which one of them bears the costs of 9LFWRULD·Vdefence? Can it matter, if the difference 
between Victor and the Innocent Bystander is not a morally deep one? 
The second horn of the dilemma is this: if the Over-Generation Problem is resisted 
simply by reiterating the claim that Victor, but not the Innocent Bystander, is broadly liable to 
defensive force, then it may seem that we are forced to endow the fact that Victor causally 
threatens Victoria, and lacks the right to do so, with a significance that cannot be reconciled with 
his lack of occurrent agency. ,VQ·WWKHIDFWWKDW9LFWRUthreatens Victoria and lacks the right to do so 
being given a tacit significance which EHOLHVWKHRIILFLDOYLHZWKDW9LFWRU·Vwronging of Victoria is 
not functioning as the key consideration? 
 The concerns lying behind the horns of this dilemma are understandable, but they can be 
dealt with by closer attention to the commitments of the Non-Liability First Account. To tackle 
the first horn, we can simply invoke the difference between being broadly liable and not being 
broadly liable: Victor is broadly liable, and the Innocent Bystander is not broadly liable. The 
Non-Liability First Account holds that this is a morally relevant distinction. To tackle the second 
horn, the moral significance of the distinction between being broadly liable and not being 
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broadly liable does not require the ascription of wrongdoing to Victor. The distinction between 
9LFWRU·VEURDGOLDELOLW\DQGWKH,QQRFHQW%\VWDQGHU·VEURDGQRQ-liability is significant because 
Victoria is broadly non-liable not to be harmed by someone who threatens her. It is that fact³
9LFWRULD·VEURDGQRQ-liability³which makes 9LFWRU·V broad liability morally significant. The Non-
/LDELOLW\)LUVW$FFRXQWGRHVQRWDWWHPSWWRGRZQSOD\WKHPRUDOVLJQLILFDQFHRI9LFWRU·VEURDG
liabilLW\,WVLPSO\PDNHVWKHPRUDOVLJQLILFDQFHRI9LFWRU·VEURDGOLDELOLW\GHULYDWLYHIURPWKH
PRUDOVLJQLILFDQFHRI9LFWRULD·VEURDGQRQ-liability. 
 
VIII 
Putting Non-Liability First.  Even if the Non-Liability First Account explains defensive permissions 
in some penumbral cases of self-defence, why should it do any interesting work in cases such as 
Culpable Attacker? Even here, in these central cases of self-defence, I think liability justifications 
are much less forthcoming than they might be. It is really WKH'HIHQGHU·Vnon-liability that does 
the explanatory heavy lifting. 
Liability justifications are primarily Attacker-focused rather than Defender-focused.18 On 
Attacker-focused views, the Central Normative Transition is completed due to a loss of the 
AttacNHU·VULJKW³or, more cumbersomely but accurately³the disappearance of the protection 
RIIHUHGE\WKH$WWDFNHU·VULJKW19 When this happens, the route to defence is unobstructed. 
It may appear at first that liability must be the missing or at least implicit ingredient in 
certain statements of how defensive permissions are generated. Again, we can look to Thomson 
and McMahan to see how the story might be constructed. First, Thomson: 
 
[W]hat makes it permissible for you to kill [Attackers and Non-Responsible Threats] is 
the fact that they will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill you, and therefore lack 
rights that you not kill them (Thomson 1991, p. 302; emphasis added).20 
 
The ¶WKHUHIRUH·LQ7KRPVRQ·VFODLPVHHPVSUemature. Why does the fact that the Attacker 
WKUHDWHQVWKH'HIHQGHU·VULJKWOHDGWRWKHORVVRIhis ULJKW"7KH'HIHQGHU·VULJKWPD\EHXQGHU
XQMXVWLILHGWKUHDWEXWZK\GRHVDQ\GLIIHUHQFHLQWKH$WWDFNHU·VPRUDOVWDQGLQJHQVXHIURPWKDW 
                                                          
18 In Lang (2014), I argued, more cautiously, that the explanatory burdens of a theory of self-
defence should be distributed more evenly between a Defender-focused and an Attacker-focused 
approach. I maintain my earlier view that the debate on defence has often been too Attacker-
focused, but I am now contending for the more fundamental importance of a Defender-focused 
approach. 
19 This caveat is to accommodate the view that our rights not to be attacked in defence only ever 
took a conditional form. See Tadros (2012) for this way of looking at matters. 
20 See Lang (2014, p. 51), for further discussion of this claim. 
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fact? The obvious answer, to Thomson, will invoke liability: in virtue of the fact that the Attacker 
WKUHDWHQVWRYLRODWHWKH'HIHQGHU·VULJKWWKH$WWDFNHUWKHQEHFRPHVOLDEOHWRGHIHQVLYHYLROHQFH 
Without liability, it may at least appear that this explanation runs aground. But what produces the 
$WWDFNHU·VOLDELOLW\" The fact that we must impute liability to the Attacker to show why the loss of 
KLVULJKWHQVXHVIURPKLVDWWHPSWHGYLRODWLRQRIWKH'HIHQGHU·VULJKWGRHVQRWVKRZOLDELOLW\WREH
anything more than a normative place-holder. 
 A more detailed and explicit acknowledgement of liability, or at least the role played by 
liability, can be found in this statement by McMahan:  
 
,I$ZLOORWKHUZLVHYLRODWH%·VULJKWKHORVHVKLVRZQULJKWQRWWREHDWWDFNHGWKXVLI%
attacks him in self-GHIHQVH%GRHVQRWYLRODWHDQ\ULJKWRI$·VWKHUHIRUH%UHWDLQVKLV
right not to be attacked; therefore A is not permitted to attack B in self-defense. On this 
theory, if one party to a conflict is justified, the opposing party cannot be. The same is 
true on the other major theories of self-defense (McMahan 2009, pp. 46-7). 
 
7KLVUHFLWDOLVPRUHGHWDLOHGWKDQ7KRPVRQ·VEXWWKHVHTXHQFHRIQRUPative claims is still 
ultimately mysterious: the fact that liability is only triggered by an objectively unjust threat for 
which an individual is morally responsible does not fully explain why the Attacker is liable. It is 
A·VXQMXVWLILHGWKUHDWDJDLQVWB which, for McMahan, is supposed to make A liable. But it is far 
from clear why that makes A liable. Why does the fact that A is guilty of attempted wrongdoing 
against B then make it permissible to inflict the same sort of harm on A?21 Though, as we have 
VHHQ0F0DKDQ·VSUHIHUUHGsubstantive theory of self-GHIHQFHLVQRW7KRPVRQ·VWKHUHDUHDOVR
higher-order similarities between them. McMahan, like Thomson, risks investing in a non sequitur. 
 How do we avoid such non sequiturs? Though it seems to me that there must be provision 
for the role played by liability,22 liability itself need not, and does not, deserve a fundamental role 
in the explanation of the Central Normative Transition. Liability, by itself, is just a normative 
place-holder. It seems to me that the explanation will run aground unless we invoke the 
'HIHQGHU·VQRQ-liability. 7KH$WWDFNHU·VOLDELOLW\is a function of the Defender·VQRQ-liability. The 
Defender is entitled to take necessary steps to defend herself against the Attacker. She is not 
entitled to take necessary steps against just anyone; that would collapse the distinction between 
                                                          
21 The arguments contained in Renzo (2017), though officially targeted at only theories of rights 
forfeiture, may I suspect be largely applicable to liability justifications, and indeed to Attacker-
focused theories more generally. 
22 The existence of the BROAD LIABILITY schema confirms this point. Though BROAD 
NON-LIABILITY is more fundamental than BROAD LIABILITY, our account of defence will 
be incomplete unless the former is accompanied by the latter. 
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self-defence and self-preservation. Given her broad non-liability, she is permitted to take 
necessary steps against those who are broadly liable, as defined by BROAD LIABILITY. 
It is only by labouring the non-liability of the Defender do we even begin to understand 
why liability in the Attacker would ensue. To have a right is to be presumptively assured of 
permissible means for protecting the interests which that right protects against threats to those 
interests. Thus canonical cases of self-defence such as Culpable Attacker, just like more penumbral 
cases such as Falling Man and Rolling Stone, offer rich pickings for the Non-Liability First 
Account. Without an attention to defensive non-liability, we cannot make sense of the existence 
or significance of defensive liability. Non-liability comes first.23 
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